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Who cares? Practical ethics and the problem of underage users on social 
networking sites 
 
Abstract 
Internet companies place a high priority on the safety of their services and on 
their corporate responsibility towards protection of all users, especially younger ones. 
However, such efforts are undermined by the large numbers of children who 
circumvent age restrictions and lie about their age to gain access to such platforms. 
This paper deals with the ethical issues that arise in this not-so-hypothetical situation. 
Who, for instance, bears responsibility for children’s welfare in this context? Are 
parents/carers ethically culpable in failing to be sufficiently vigilant or even 
facilitating their children’s social media use? Do industry providers do enough to 
enforce their own regulations and remove those users they know to be underage? How 
far does a duty of care extend? Regulation of age restrictions has, it is argued, created 
unintended consequences that heighten online dangers for young people. While 
children are inevitably drawn to new online spaces for entertainment and fun, should 
their rights to participate in the social world around them be curtailed to ensure their 
best interests and those of the wider community?  Such questions now pose 
significant practical and ethical dilemmas for policy makers and other stakeholders 
involved in internet governance. It especially highlights the question of responsibility 
for protection of minors online and calls into question whether the current model of 
shared responsibility is working.   
  
Keywords: social networking, internet safety, protection of minors, children and 
privacy, self-regulation 
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Introduction 
 
Social networking is now one of the most popular applications on the internet, 
providing a virtual platform for millions of people across the globe to effortlessly 
share information and communicate with friends and family, irrespective of time or 
location. The phenomenal rise of services such as Facebook has been a crucial driver 
of growth in the internet industry, bringing new populations who may previously have 
been excluded into the online world. Online social interaction is ideally suited to 
many populations with special needs, enabling them to participate more fully in a 
virtual environment than they might in the offline world (Dobransky and Hargittai 
2006). Older internet users, for instance, constitute one of the fastest growing 
demographics on social networking platforms, counteracting the impression that they 
are somehow less technologically adept (Eugène Loos et al. 2012; Buse 2009). This 
article is concerned with the other end of the age spectrum and deals with the 
youngest users of social networking sites, specifically those who are underage, as 
determined by the age restriction of 13 years placed on most social networking sites 
(SNS).1    
Child online safety and the protection of minors in the digital environment has 
been an important area of policy concern since the development of the world wide 
web. Wide-ranging international protocols are in place to counteract the most 
egregious of online abuses affecting children (UNICEF 2011; ITU 2009). Extensive 
efforts are also made by internet companies, by legislators and by civil society to 
                                                 
1
 The age restriction of 13 years stems from data protection legislation in the United States, the 
Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act of 1998 (COPPA), whereby websites that collect information 
from users under the age of 13 must obtain verifiable parental consent. As such, many internet services 
set 13 as the age bar above which parental consent is no longer required.  See Montgomery, K. C. 
(2007). Generation digital: politics, commerce, and childhood in the age of the internet. Cambridge, 
Mass. ; London: MIT. 
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ensure high standards in online child safety policy.  There are many services 
specifically dedicated to the needs of children, providing a protected, ‘walled garden’ 
in which the youngest children can explore and learn safely within an online 
environment (Reese et al. 2010).  Technology solutions have also been developed to 
enable parents and carers to play an active role in monitoring or filtering younger 
children’s internet access (FOSI 2011; Kirwil 2009). Yet, inevitably children’s innate 
curiosity, combined with peer pressure and the appeal of exciting content on major 
SNS platforms has meant that large numbers of young people lie about their age to 
register on services that were not designed for them.  How concerned we should be 
about this is a matter of debate. The purpose of this article is to examine some of the 
ethical issues that arise, including perspectives from industry, parents and from 
children themselves. While social networking services are largely international in 
nature, the scope of the current discussion is confined primarily to the European 
Union where the topic has received particular attention, as well as the United States 
where legal provisions for children’s online privacy protection provides an important 
determining framework.  The problem of ‘underage’ children using social media 
applications in contravention of the terms of service challenges the model of shared 
responsibility for protecting children’s welfare online. Resolving the many anomalies 
that this creates remains a thorny problem for policy makers but the debate is one that 
has significant implications for wider issues of internet governance, ethics and the 
social uses of technology. 
 
Defining the problem 
Many social networking companies set the age of 13 as the minimum age for 
registering on their service.  This particular age restriction derives from the Children’s 
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Online Privacy Protection Act (COPPA) enacted in the United States in 1998 and 
effective since 2000. Under COPPA, commercial websites must acquire verifiable 
parental consent in order to collect and use information from children under the age of 
13. For users under this age, companies must put in place a series of mechanisms and 
protections to comply with COPPA regulations.  As a result, many internet companies 
operating in the United States have chosen to avoid such obligations altogether by 
restricting access via their terms of service to those over the age of 13.  Not all 
services are age-restricted and most companies also provide additional privacy 
protection for users over 13 and under the age of 18.   Those services that do restrict 
access to over-13s require users to enter a date of birth on registration but typically do 
not employ any other means of age verification. Therefore, simply entering a false age 
will enable anyone to register on the platform in question.  
Research shows that such age restrictions on social networking sites have 
largely proved ineffective or are widely ignored.  In the United States, for instance, 
where the most popular services are based (Facebook, Google+, MySpace etc.), more 
than half of teenagers aged 12 to 13 use online social networks, rising rapidly to over 
80% of older teenagers (Lenhart et al. 2010). In Europe, social networking is similarly 
amongst the most popular of online activities for children aged between 9 and 16 
years. According to EU Kids Online, three quarters of all young internet users in 
Europe between the ages of 13 and 16 and one third of 9-12 year olds has a profile on 
a social networking service (Sonia Livingstone et al. 2011).2 Taking Facebook as an 
example – given its position as the most popular social networking service in Europe 
– one in 5 of all 9-12 year olds in Europe who use the internet have circumvented the 
                                                 
2
 EU Kids Online is a thematic network supported under the European Commission Safer Internet 
Programme and is aimed at enhancing knowledge of children’s and parent’s experiences and practices 
regarding risky and safer use of the internet and online technologies.  In 2010, it conducted a face-to-
face, in-home survey of 25,000 9-16 year old internet users and their parents in 25 countries using a 
stratified random sample and self-completion methods for sensitive questions. 
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age restriction to register a profile on the service. This rises to 34% of 9-12 year olds 
in the United Kingdom and Finland, 42% in Denmark, 46% in the Czech Republic 
and 48% in Slovenia. Ireland and the UK, as examples, are fairly typical of the 
European profile with about 1 in 5 or 20% of 9 year olds using SNS.  However, this 
rises sharply after the age of 10 so that by the age of 12, approximately 60% of 
children have registered a Facebook account, using an incorrect date of birth (O'Neill 
and Dinh 2012). 
There is evidence to suggest that many parents or carers are complicit in 
allowing underage children to gain access to social networking sites.  Over three 
quarters of parents surveyed in the United States believed it was acceptable to allow 
their child to create an account on a social networking service in violation of the 
minimum age requirement (boyd et al. 2011). Most also believed that it is parents 
who should have the final say as to whether their child could access social networking 
services. In Europe, EU Kids Online found that half of all parents do not restrict their 
child’s use of SNS. Among children whose parents impose no restrictions, most have 
an SNS profile, including three quarters of the youngest ages (Sonia Livingstone et al. 
2011). Interestingly, among those whose parents restrict their SNS use, younger 
children appear to respect parental regulation and for the most part do not have a 
profile at all.   
The risks that arise for underage SNS users stem from the fact that given they 
have entered an indeterminate age (and possibly name), they violate the ‘real identity’ 
policy of most social networking providers and will not be able to avail of the 
protections and default settings in place for their general age group.3 Thus, EU Kids 
                                                 
3
 According to the Safer Social Networking Principles of the EU, service providers endeavor to make 
their platforms age appropriate for minors (typically between the ages of 13 and 18) by restricting the 
visibility of profiles, maintaining privacy by default, providing easy to use tools, terms of service and 
help resources as well as response mechanisms.  See  European Commission (2009)  
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Online found that over a quarter of 9-12 year olds had a profile set to public so that 
anyone could see their information (Livingstone et al. 2012).   By contrast, a correctly 
entered age for an account under the age of 18 would typically have a default private 
setting and would not be visible in a public web search.  EU Kids Online also found 
that of those with a public profile, a third of 11-12 year olds admitted they did not 
know how to change privacy settings.  Moreover, children were more likely to post 
personal information such as identifying information including their address and 
phone number when their address was set to public rather than private or partially 
private (Sonia Livingstone et al. 2011).  
Young people report that despite the many benefits, their online experiences 
are not trouble free. Over half of all children say that there are things online that 
bother children their age (S. Livingstone et al. 2011) and cite examples of unwanted 
contacts by strangers, scary things online and cyberbullying as among the persistent 
problems they encounter (Görzig 2011; Livingstone et al. 2013). Therefore, while 
understandably drawn to participate on platforms that have proved enormously 
popular among young people, children under the age of 13 – with or without their 
parents’ knowledge – run significant risks of encountering potentially harmful content 
or contact online (Elisabeth Staksrud et al. 2012). The ethical implications for the 
various stakeholders involved are considered in the remainder of this paper.  
 
Industry perspectives 
The presence of substantial numbers of ‘underage’ children on websites and 
services designed for older audiences provides something of a dilemma and an 
embarrassment for many internet companies. Companies such as Facebook do not 
readily admit to the issue but reportedly delete approximately 20,000 children a day 
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for lying about their age.4  Officially, where a web service becomes aware of an 
underage account in contravention of their terms of service, they take steps to have 
that account deleted.5 In setting an age restriction at 13 and including this in their 
terms of service, such companies explicitly make a statement that they neither cater 
for or allow young children access their sites.  Facebook’s CEO, Mark Zuckerberg, 
famously remarked that kids under 13 should be allowed on the service, vowing to 
challenge the age restrictions on privacy rules imposed under COPPA (Lev–Ram 
2011). Yet, despite suggestions in the Wall Street Journal in the run up to its public 
listing in 2012 that Facebook was preparing to launch an under 13s service, at the 
time of writing this had not materialized.6  While it would be perfectly possible to 
adapt such a service or make provision for younger children, in order to be COPPA-
compliant companies would have to abide by stricter privacy regulations and to tailor 
their safety information to a much younger audience, involving greater effort and 
expense, suggesting that most companies intend to maintain the status quo (E. 
Staksrud and Livingstone 2011).  
The argument that companies need to do more in recognition of the large 
numbers of younger subscribers stems from the notion that they have a duty of care to 
all those who use their online services whether they are legitimately registered or not. 
Duty of care may be defined as a legal obligation on individuals or entities to ensure 
that they adhere to a standard of reasonable care while performing any acts that could 
foreseeably harm others (Henderson and Yarbrough 2002).  The duty of care rule is 
well-established in many areas of law though its application to cyberspace is not 
                                                 
4
 This was divulged in the testimony of one Facebook’s privacy advisors before an Australian 
parliamentary cyber-safety committee.  See: http://www.dailytelegraph.com.au/news/banning-baby-
faces-from-social-site-facebook/story-e6freuy9-1226025663992  
5
 Facebook provides a form to report underage users: 
https://www.facebook.com/help/contact/?id=210036389087590 
6
 http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052702303506404577444711741019238.html  
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always clear (Henderson and Yarbrough 2002). For a variety of reasons, internet 
service providers or ISPs enjoy as internet intermediaries an immunity from 
obligations arising from duty of care regarding content carried on their networks. 
Such immunity exists on the basis that ISPs act as a mere conduit  and do not in 
theory have specific knowledge of any potentially harmful material carried on their 
networks.  Such exemptions have been approved, for instance under the European E-
Commerce Directive,  on the basis that where harmful content is identified, providers 
undertake to comply with ‘so-called notice and take down’ court orders to remove 
offending content, (Schellekens 2011; Verbiest and Spindler 2007). When it comes to 
data protection, the European Union’s Data Protection Directive applies strict rules 
that require companies to take all appropriate measures to protect data and 
information they possess against accidental or unlawful destruction or loss (Tikk 
2011). Thus internet companies place a high priority in ensuring the security of their 
systems and are subject to audit by public regulatory authorities in how they store and 
protect data (Office of the Data Protection Commissioner 2011).7   
Liability for other aspects of services offered by social networking companies 
and responsibility towards users of the platform are set out in the Terms of Service 
provided by companies. From a legal standpoint, service providers must clearly 
specify the limitations on their responsibility by outlining the terms and conditions 
governing access to their services.   Thus, in the case of Facebook’s Statement of 
Rights and Responsibilities, users are required to provide their real name and 
information (section 4), including age, and confirm that they are over the age of 13 
(section 4.5).8  Furthermore, the terms notify that while Facebook attempts to keep the 
                                                 
7
 See for instance the report of the Irish Data Protection Commissioner in its audit of Facebook Ireland 
Ltd. (Office of the Data Protection Commissioner 2011)  
8
 See: http://www.facebook.com/legal/terms  
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platform safe, it cannot guarantee it (section 3), and that it is provided as a service for 
people to use as is and at their own risk (section 16.3).    
If there is no strict legal obligation on companies such as Facebook to assume 
responsibility for underage users, there is surely an ethical obligation stemming at the 
very least from the requirement in common law to exercise a due standard of care in 
ensuring the safety of the service given the likelihood that it will be accessed by many 
kinds of users with varying levels of skill or ability (Vedder 2001).   
A framework for the safety provisions provided in  social networking 
environments is contained in the Safer Social Networking Principles, a code of 
practice developed jointly by the European Commission and 21 of the most prominent 
social networking companies (European Commission 2009).  Under these principles, 
companies undertake to make their services age-appropriate and safe for the intended 
audience. Thus, according to the principles, acceptable use policies should be made 
available to all users in a clear, easily understood manner; easy to use mechanisms 
and tools to report harmful or abusive content should be in place; and companies 
should enable and encourage users to employ a safe approach to personal information 
and privacy. In the case of Facebook, the company cites special precautions to ensure 
that users between the ages of 13 and 17 have more restrictive privacy settings 
(Donoso 2011).  For instance, accounts of minors are never listed in public searches, 
sharing of information for under-18s is limited to friends and networks, and where 
geo-location services are used, a minor’s account can only disclose their location to 
confirmed friends.9  Such privacy-enhancing provisions are part of wider efforts to 
ensure better safety and control of social networking services for under-18s. Crucially 
however, if an under 13s user enters an incorrect age, i.e. over the age of 18, they are 
                                                 
9
 See Facebook Self-Declaration for EU Safer Social Networking Principles, 
http://ec.europa.eu/information_society/activities/social_networking/docs/new_self_decl_2010/faceboo
k.pdf  
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likely to be exposed to far greater risk (and have adult settings applied) than if the age 
entered is under 18.   
An effective system of age verification would, of course, be a solution to the 
problem of registrations based on a false age.  Currently, social networking sites may 
be said to operate a system of self-certification whereby the only verification provided 
is the word of the individual user. An age verification solution is one that requires 
additional, verifiable confirmation of the identity and the age of the individual 
attempting to register or access the proposed (age-restricted) service.  Age verification 
is required by law in some countries, for instance in the United Kingdom, for access 
to certain services such as online gambling (limited to over 18s), or to e-commerce 
services selling alcohol, cigarettes and medication (France). In Germany, a more 
elaborate system of verifying identity and age is in place to control access to all online 
adult services.  A report prepared by the European Commission for the Safer Internet 
Forum in 2008 concluded that while a variety of systems have been deployed for 
specific services, including electronic identity cards, use of credit/debit cards, and 
semantic analysis technologies, there was no existing approach that was fully 
effective or was capable of being applied on a pan-European basis (European 
Commission 2008). Each has limitations or can be easily circumvented. Age 
verification techniques that seek to draw on social security numbers for instance may 
also be subject to legal restrictions.  Additionally, using technical means of age 
verification may create additional risks or have unintended consequences through ‘the 
illusion of a safe zone which is not actually safe from determined and highly 
motivated predators’ (European Commission 2008).  For all of these reasons, safety 
advocates have tended to argue that technical methods of verification on their own are 
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never enough. Parental responsibility and education for user responsibility must, it is 
argued, be the primary focus of awareness raising efforts. 
 
Parental responsibility 
 Parents have long been deemed the most important guardians of children’s 
welfare online (Kaiser Foundation 2004; Livingstone and Bober 2006). Since its 
inception, the European Union’s Safer Internet Programme has focused efforts on 
encouraging the development of classification systems equivalent to those that 
operate in the traditional media world as guidance for parents and carers in 
supervising their children’s online use (Keller and Verhulst 2000). In addition, 
extensive awareness-raising efforts have been developed to educate parents, teachers 
and other adults with responsibility for youth about online risks through the provision 
of safety tips and advice about how to best monitor young people’s use of internet 
technologies.  Parental controls or filtering technologies that allow parents and 
guardians to monitor what young people do online and to restrict access to 
unapproved sites have been a central part of this policy (FOSI 2011).   Such tools are 
designed to empower parents to set limits on the amount of time that children spend 
online, decide on which content or which services are appropriate for children and to 
facilitate a dialogue between parents and children about online use.   
 More widely, a marked shift has taken place in policies protecting young 
people in the audiovisual arena whereby the kind of close regulation of content found 
on media systems such as broadcasting and theatrical cinema distribution applies in a 
much weaker form in the online environment. Thus, while the European Union’s 
Audiovisual Media Services Directive (European Commission 2007), Europe’s pre-
eminent media policy instrument for the audiovisual sector, recognizes that online, 
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on-demand services greatly increase choices to the consumer, it warns that consumers 
must also ultimately take responsibility for the content they access (Helberger 2008).  
Measures to protect against children’s access to the most harmful content are 
mandated through the use of access codes and other means. However, content that on 
traditional television could be defined as simply ‘harmful’ and would normally be 
scheduled after the ‘watershed’, has no restriction in an online or on-demand 
environment.   It is in this context, that emphasis is placed on parents assuming 
responsibility and being vigilant in supervising young people’s media consumption 
and communication habits (Helberger 2007; McGonagle 2003).  
 It may well be the case that when it comes to social media, many parents in 
fact decide to allow their children to access social networking services. Parents may 
feel, for example, that while their children are underage, they are confident they are 
able to manage the risks.  This is the case established by boyd et al’s research (2011) 
in the United States where one fifth of parents of 10 year olds, a third of parents of 11 
year olds and over half (55 per cent) of parents of 12 year olds acknowledged that 
their children had Facebook accounts. Many parents also admitted that they helped 
their children set up the account. Among those who knew that their child was below 
the age of 13 when they joined, over two thirds reported that they had assisted in 
creating the account.  Moreover, most (90 per cent) were aware of the age restrictions, 
though a third believed this was a recommendation rather than a requirement. Among 
reasons given as to why they would allow their child use a platform in violation of the 
terms of service, most parents cited educational and school-related purposes, and to 
communicate with family and friends. Half also said they would allow use of the 
service only under supervision.  
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Research from EU Kids Online shows that there are considerable cultural 
variations in parental attitudes to children’s social networking use (Lobe 2011; Sonia 
Livingstone et al. 2011).  Across Europe, one third of parents do not allow their child 
to have an SNS profile.  A fifth say their child can only use SNS with supervision and 
half say they do not restrict their child’s use of SNS.   This varies considerably from 
country to country, however. In France, nearly half of all children (45%) are not 
allowed to use SNS (and accordingly, there are relatively few underage children on 
social networking platforms). Similar numbers of parents place restrictions on 
younger children’s internet use in countries such as Greece, Italy and Spain while 
children in Northern European countries such as Lithuania, Estonia, the Netherlands 
and Denmark experience the fewest restrictions (and higher numbers of underage 
users).  
From a practical standpoint, two interpretations of findings such as these are 
possible.  On the one hand, it might be argued that whether through pressure from 
younger children or by deciding that regulations imposed by social networking 
providers are inadequate, many parents take the decision to allow younger children to 
use services designed for over 13s.  Internet safety policy advice has long promoted 
the importance of active dialogue between parents and children about their internet 
use and one might therefore view such practice as a positive example of parents and 
children successfully negotiating the nature and limits of their online activity (Tufte 
and Tufte 1999; Livingstone and Helsper 2008).  On the other hand, an alternative 
interpretation of parents’ actions in this area might suggest that the burden of 
responsibility that falls on them is too great. Many parents may feel so overwhelmed, 
possibly through their own lack of digital skills, that they fail to take adequate control 
of their children’s digital lives. Whether the former approach constitutes responsible 
Underage use of SNS    /      14 
parenting, given the nature of the risks involved, is another matter. The latter 
interpretation raises issues about the unfair burden of responsibility, particularly in 
light of the lack of support that many parents feel in the digital arena and similarly 
highlights a debate about the shared nature of responsibility in children’s online 
safety.  Yet children also are actors in this and must assume some element of 
responsibility for their actions in the digital space.  
 
 
Role of young people 
 
As the direct users of social networking services, young people by accessing 
and using social networking services take responsibility for their actions and 
behaviour in the online world and for their personal safety. Among the many risks 
that young people face online indeed are those created by young people themselves, 
whether in the form of cyberbullying between peers, misuse of personal data or 
hacking into friends’ accounts, or harmful or offensive content created by other users 
(S. Livingstone et al. 2011; Elisabeth Staksrud et al. 2012).  While policy makers 
understandably continue to emphasise the importance of empowering young people to 
take responsibility for their own actions, to develop better and safer practices and 
models of digital citizenship, the reality is that in many cases, young people lack the 
basic skills and only become aware of safety issues when something goes wrong.  In 
the EU Kids Online survey, 45% of younger Facebook users, aged 11 to 12, said they 
did not know how to manage their privacy settings. A further 39% said they did not 
know how to block another user.  Skills do increase with age and by the age of 15 or 
16, the vast majority of young people have mastered the privacy and safety 
mechanisms associated with social networking sites (Sonia Livingstone et al. 2011).  
Age, in this sense, is used as a proxy for intellectual and emotional maturity though a 
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difficulty in determining an appropriate age for the necessary cognitive and practical 
skills required to manage one’s own safety is that children vary in their pace of 
development (Berger 2012).  Hence, setting age 12 or 13 as a cut-off above which 
young people are assumed to be capable of managing their own safety ignores the fact 
that some will be sufficiently mature at an earlier age, yet others will still lack 
sufficient maturity until a later age. 
Notwithstanding the complex issues of child and adolescent development, all 
minors under the age of 18 are entitled to protection of their personal safety and of 
their data, a fact recognised by internet companies in setting certain default measures 
such as restricting access to personal profiles or preventing visibility of personal data 
beyond approved contacts (European Commission 2009).  The question arises, 
therefore, whether such rights are forfeited once children find and exploit breaches in 
the measures taken by companies to restrict access to their services. If due care and 
diligence has been exercised by the owner, surely users avail of services, particularly 
in unauthorised forms, at their own risk? The counter argument from a child 
protection standpoint is that where the protective measures designed to restrict access 
are so weak as to allow easy access to anyone, arguably it is the owner rather than the 
user who has failed in their responsibility.  
 
 
 
The practical ethics of social networking  
 
The sharing of responsibility for protecting young people online is a necessary 
response to the effective management of risks in the virtual environment and the 
related, complex issues that arise in internet governance and regulation. However, in 
the case of underage users of social networking services, it leads to a highly contested 
area that renders online safety less effective and creates new, unintended and 
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potentially more dangerous risks for children who breach safety regulations.  
Considering the practical ethics of the conflicts that arise in this context is likely to 
prove more effective than merely focusing on the legal aspects of negligence 
involved.  Social networking is very much a ‘social technology’ (Nelson and Nelson 
2002), combining both technical innovations as well as widely diverse communicative 
and behavioural dimensions on the part of social actors. Following Thomson (2007), a 
debate on the practical ethics involved – as opposed to contesting companies’ legal 
responsibilities – has three broad advantages. Firstly, it provides a bridge between 
theory and practice, enabling a principled approach to be taken in an area not well 
catered for in existing policy or regulatory practice.  Secondly, it is particularly 
helpful in assessing the institutional context in which social networking interactions 
are located.  Where ethics in the main has been concerned with either individual or 
societal levels of behaviour, the institutional middle ground has received less attention 
and a practical ethics is better suited to framing the issues and potential conflicts at 
this middle range level. Thirdly, practical ethics is also helpful in highlighting the 
political nature of decision making involved, focusing attention on authority and the 
deliberative process by which decisions are made, particularly in the context of 
professional practices that are self-regulated, as is the case in most instance of internet 
governance.  
With this in mind, how does one assess the practical ethical issues contained 
in the contested topic of underage use of social networking services?  Following the 
logic of shared responsibility for child safety online which includes all relevant 
stakeholders, it might on the face of it be argued that industry, parents, educators and 
children themselves all share some element of responsibility for such anomalous and 
risky online practices.  Equally, responsibility for resolving the problems can be seen 
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as shared by all.  Such an approach is plausible and in keeping with the efforts of 
educators and internet safety experts who seek to instil in young people the skills and 
awareness of their own abilities in protecting themselves.   
However, to grant all stakeholders equal status is surely unreasonable when it 
is clear, particularly in the case of the youngest users, there are gross disparities in 
power and capability when it comes to making effective choices in safety.  As ‘special 
needs’ users, children under the age of 13 in general lack the maturity (as recognised 
in privacy legislation) and the ability to grant consent for their data to be used and 
therefore cannot be held to the same level of accountability as those in positions of 
authority whether they be parents, guardians or providers of internet services.  
Considering, therefore, the differing levels of power wielded by the various 
stakeholders concerned, the oft-repeated analogy between online safety and safety in 
the built environment may be of some assistance.   In this way, online safety is often 
compared to the need for safety on roads, particularly in areas where children are 
playing; similarly, children’s play spaces be they physical or virtual, in playgrounds 
or in online environments, require similar considerations for safe practices as well as 
good design. Parental responsibility is necessarily all the greater in accordance with 
the children’s age and level of development. Thus, just as parents ensure that children 
don’t cycle on the open road before they are ready, or without wearing a bicycle 
helmet, or don’t cross roads where it is unsafe to do so, similarly they are advised to 
take equivalent precautions regarding their children’s activities in the online space.10  
Parents, therefore, in the circumstances considered here assume a greater share of 
responsibility than their children in facilitating social network access, or by failing to 
take account of dangers their children may encounter.  
                                                 
10
 Or for example, the analogy drawn in the Byron report, commissioned by the UK Prime Minister 
Gordon Browne into provision for online safety, where pointedly it was argued we do not let children 
dive into a swimming pool before learning how to swim. See: (Byron 2008) 
Underage use of SNS    /      18 
 
However, the analogy is not just focused on end users – parents or children – 
it also applies to the engineers, providers and other agencies responsible for creating 
and servicing the built environment. Where evident deficiencies exist in the design, 
safety features, or measures designed to restrict access to an area deemed unsuitable 
for certain age groups, it is to the designers we should look to examine more closely 
how seriously they have taken their commitment to enforce their own regulations.  As 
we have seen, social networking companies who apply age restrictions declare openly 
that they neither allow nor cater for underage users.  Moreover, many declare that 
they take further measures to identify and delete underage users from their services 
and prevent them from attempting to re-register, by employing cookies for example.  
Yet, despite substantial evidence revealing that such efforts are ineffective or easily 
flouted, many of the major companies involved have resisted adopting any further 
measures to verify younger users’ age or identity, casting doubt over the priority they 
accord to the issue of underage use.   
Applying an ethics of ‘safety by design’ would yield a different result.  Were 
companies to adopt the principle that its services would, from the outset, be designed 
around fitness for purpose for the intended age group, measures to confirm users’ 
credentials would be a primary requirement. Similarly, default settings to ensure 
maximum levels of safety, security and privacy would be enforced, including 
graduated measures tailored to the ages (and needs) of different categories of 
audiences.   
 
 
Policy responses 
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A consideration of the practical ethics of underage user on social networking 
services as discussed above points inevitably to the political process in which policy 
is shaped, in which deficiencies in current arrangements are addressed and prospects 
for future, better provision is debated. It is in this context that the European Union’s 
Vice President for the Digital Agenda, Neelie Kroes, convened a coalition of the 
CEOs of leading internet companies operating in Europe to take action on specific 
measures designed to enhance online child safety and to agree industry-wide 
measures to tackle a range of persistent problems that had the effect of undermining 
public confidence.11 The CEO Coalition identified five central issues with which it 
would engage to proffer new solutions in support of better safety for children.  Age 
verification, or mechanisms to manage underage use, was not one of these.12 Instead, 
a consideration of age featured in its work through a commitment to provide better 
classification and labelling of age-appropriate content and through a commitment to 
make privacy settings as safe as possible for the ages concerned.  While sometimes 
short on specifics, the implication of such commitments is that better controls could 
be developed and implemented and that this is something that industry alone can 
provide.    
One of the reasons presumably that age restrictions on access to services was 
not specifically dealt with is that it places an expensive burden on industry to 
introduce access controls in conflict with their open access business model. Unlike the 
case of online gambling, for instance, where specific legal restrictions apply, the 
                                                 
11
 The CEO Coalition to make the internet a better place for kids was convened in December 2011 and 
committed over the course of one year to take positive action to ensure internet experience was 
beneficial for children.  See: 
http://ec.europa.eu/information_society/activities/sip/self_reg/index_en.htm  
12
 The five areas were:  i) Simple and robust reporting tools for users; ii) Age-appropriate privacy 
settings; iii) Wider use of content classification; iv) Wider availability and use of parental control; and 
v) Effective takedown of child abuse material.   
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question of underage SNS access is one of policy, not law.  There may be broad 
consensus between companies and stakeholders of the desirability of better age 
verification mechanisms though its priority lies below that of other online child 
protection measures.  As an alternative, policy makers and industry have preferred to 
focus on improving the effectiveness and the take of parental control technologies. 
Parental control tools allow parents and guardians to set restrictions at the point of 
access whether on the device itself (e.g. smartphone, laptop, personal computer) or at 
the service level (for instance, on a network router controlling access to defined web 
sites or services, or on browser software).  Thus parents are enjoined through better 
recognition of the age-appropriateness of online content and services to apply the 
necessary technical solutions to implement age controls.  The application of parental 
control tools goes beyond the use of social media and their use remains sometimes 
controversial (O'Neill et al. 2013), yet parents have never had such an array of 
technology available to them to monitor and shape their children’s media and internet 
exposure (Thierer 2009).  
What policy makers have sought to do, however, is confirm the underlying 
age limits for consent to participate in online social media services.  The most recent 
revision of children’s online privacy protection legislation in the United States 
(COPPA) confirms the applicability of verifiable parental consent for children under 
13 for all commercial websites, online services, mobile apps and plug-ins.  New 
means of supplying parental consent include electronic scans, parental payment 
systems, video or phone conference, or through the use of government-issued IDs. A 
similar recognition of 13 as the age below which parental consent is required to 
collect data from children is included in European proposals for a revised privacy 
regulation, thus bringing these regimes formally into line  (European Commission 
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2012).  However, service providers are not obliged to obtain any additional 
verification of age once users register, truthfully or otherwise, to access their service. 
COPPA’s primary objective is to place parents in control of information collected for 
commercial purposes under the age of 13. It is not specifically about safety, nor does 
a COPPA-compliant website represent an endorsement of its suitability for children.  
Similarly, where parents choose to support underage children accessing over-13 sites, 
it is not inherently dangerous but does violate the original objective of COPPA 
(Magid 2013 ).  
It would appear, therefore, that promotion of parental control tools by 
initiatives such as the CEO Coalition with the wider legislative recognition of 
protecting younger children (under 13) in the online world underlines further the role 
of the parent rather than the industry in online safety. This perpetuates an individualist 
emphasis in devolving responsibility to parents and children alike for a wide range of 
decisions about media access (O'Neill 2010).  Despite the greater collective emphases 
exhibited in pan-industry cooperation in improving safety provisions, the balance of 
responsibility for younger children’s safety and security has not substantially altered. 
This despite the fact that protection of minors in the online world has been recognised 
as one of the core values of the European audiovisual system to which policy makers, 
governments and industry alike have been asked to devote increased attention  
(European Commission 2013). It would appear that industry efforts to make internet 
services safer for children include development of more effective control mechanisms 
but under the broad heading of user empowerment, their implementation is 
fundamentally one which is left to young people and their parents for final arbitration.  
 
 
 
Conclusion 
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The phenomenon of young people’s use of social networking services is one 
that has arisen in relatively recent times and has brought to the fore many issues 
regarding responsibility for online safety especially when access to such services is 
unauthorised.  This article has considered the particular case of underage use of social 
media services in cases where providers have chosen to ban access to those under the 
age of 13 rather than adopt the legislative requirement for verifiable parental consent 
for younger children. The questions that arise in this context concern who bears 
responsibility for children’s safety and welfare.  Industry declares in such 
circumstances that it neither supports younger users nor has knowledge of underage 
use of such services. Where it does detect unauthorised access, it moves swiftly to 
remove the users concerned. However, research shows that the intrinsic appeal of 
social media services proves irresistible to many young people and that as many as 
60% of 11 and 12 year olds in some countries routinely use services intended for an 
older audience.  The harm that may arise from such use is a matter for further research 
but the issue remains that such users contravene terms of service for the sites involved 
and fail to gain the protection afforded to legitimate users. In many instances, parents 
have been shown to be complicit in allowing such a scenario to develop either 
through concern that their children are not left out of digital opportunities or through a 
lack of awareness of the risks involved.  Young people themselves also bear 
responsibility for their own actions in seeking to gain access in the first place through 
supplying false information on first registration.   
The main consideration in this article has been on the practical ethics, or 
decision-making relating to appropriate conduct, in a situation where online safety 
and welfare of children has long been recognised as a shared responsibility.  The 
respective roles of industry, of parents and of young people themselves were assessed 
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in turn and to whom obligations in each case are seen to apply.  In the practical realm 
of implementation of policies designed to enhance online young people’s safety, 
industry efforts to develop new initiatives to promote safer use were identified.  In 
this context, industry leadership arises as a result of its role as originator of services 
for whom a duty of care applies. However, it is to parents and caregivers more often 
than not that decision making and implementation of policies falls.  Wide legal 
protections are afforded to younger children against commercial data collection 
methods, yet enforcement is noticeably weak and prompts, as the title of this paper 
provocatively suggests, a question as to whether this is a topic to be taken seriously.  
The continuing policy priority accorded to protection of minors in the audiovisual 
world would imply that it is, however undermined by the anomalies of youthful 
participation in social media. Arguably, more sustained attention to the public policy 
dimensions of this debate would imply greater attention to the infrastructural and 
design aspects of internet service provision just as they do in all aspects of the built 
environment.  Such an emphasis would necessarily require greater clarity about safety 
standards, underpinned by an ethics of public space, and reduce the opportunity or 
need for enforced risk-taking by younger children. 
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